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Abstract
Cascading failures are one of the main reasons for blackouts in electric power
transmission grids. The economic cost of such failures is in the order of tens of
billion dollars annually. The loading level of power system is a key aspect to de-
termine the amount of the damage caused by cascading failures. Existing studies
show that the blackout size exhibits phase transitions as the loading level increases.
This paper investigates the impact of the topology of a power grid on phase transi-
tions in its robustness. Three spectral graph metrics are considered: spectral radius,
effective graph resistance and algebraic connectivity. Experimental results from a
model of cascading failures in power grids on the IEEE power systems demon-
strate the applicability of these metrics to design/optimise a power grid topology
for an enhanced phase transition behaviour of the system.
1 Introduction
The electric power grid is of key importance to modern societies, not only because of
the vital role of electric power for daily life, but also because of the strong dependencies
of other critical infrastructures (such as telecommunications, transportation, and water
supply [1, 2]) on power grids. Security and continuous availability of power supply is
crucial. Disruption of power delivery systems potentially causes severe effects on the
public order and substantial economic cost for the society [3]. Although secure and
safe operation makes the power grid one of the most robust critical infrastructures and
significantly reduces the risk of large-scale blackouts, many countries still suffer from
catastrophic blackouts paralysing the daily life [4, 5].
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A cascading failure is an initial disturbance followed by a sequence of dependent
failures of individual components. Each failure successively weakens and stresses the
system as a whole making the subsequent failures more likely [6]. The networked
structure of complex power grids makes it possible to analyse and better understand
interdependencies between its components by adopting a Complex Networks approach.
In such an approach, the collective emergent behaviour of complex power grids is
assessed instead of the detailed behaviour of a system at the individual components
level.
Interconnectedness of the power grid enables shipping of bulk electric power over
the grid. However, it also allows the spread of local failures into the global grid result-
ing into large-scale cascading failures. In a power grid, a single failure may propagate
into the rest of the network in different ways including instabilities in frequency and
voltage levels, human mistakes, hidden failures in the protection mechanism, and line
overloads. Interdependencies between components become stronger as the loading
level of the system increases, and consequently, more significant damage emerges due
to the cascade. For example, a failure of a transmission line results in much larger
damage due to cascading overloads if the system is over stressed. Although a higher
loading level almost always results in a larger blackout size, the relationship between
loading level and blackout size is not linear. Previous studies [7, 8, 9, 10] have shown
that the blackout size exhibits phase transitions when increasing loading level. This
suggests the existence of critical loading points at which large and abrupt change oc-
curs in the size of the damage due to cascades with only small changes in the network
loading.
Although many researchers [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] have investigated/reported the ex-
istence of phase transitions in the robustness of power grids, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no attention has been paid to the assessment of the impact of a power grid
topology on the phase transitions in its robustness. Phase transitions occur in many
other complex systems such as e.g. in network synchronisation and epidemic pro-
cesses [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. In these fields/studies, the phase transition phenomena is
analysed from a complex networks point of view, and related to spectral graph prop-
erties of the corresponding graph of the system. Inspired by these studies, this paper
investigates the impact of the topology on the phase transitions in the robustness of
a power transmission grid by focussing on three spectral graph metrics [18]: spectral
radius, algebraic connectivity and effective graph resistance.
2 A model of cascading failures in power grids
A power grid is a three-layered complex interconnected network consisting of genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution parts. Electric power is shipped from the generation
buses to distribution substations through the transmission buses, all interconnected by
transmission lines. The impedances, voltage levels at each individual power station,
voltage phase differences between power stations and loads at terminal stations con-
trol power flow in the grid. An ideal model of power grids necessarily captures the
continuous dynamics of generators, discrete dynamics and hidden anomalies in protec-
tion mechanisms, non-linear AC equations that govern the power flow throughout the
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network, and the behaviour of the operators [19]. To reduce complexity, each model
deploys a certain level of abstraction to mimic the power grids.
Due to strong couplings between components, a local disturbance affects not only
the neighbouring components, but also the far away components in a power grid. Mod-
els relying on Kirchoff Laws (e.g. [7, 20] ) capture this interdependency between power
system components, unlike models deploying topological approaches in which the ex-
cess power is distributed over neighbouring components based on local redistribution
rules [21, 22, 11, 23]. This paper deploys a similar model to [7, 20] relying on Kir-
choff Laws, introduced by Koç et al. [12] and implemented in MATCASC, a MATLAB
based tool to simulate cascading line overloads [12].
MATCASC models a power transmission grid as a graph to analyse the cascading
effect due to line overloads (See Figure 2). In a graph representation of a power grid,
nodes represent generation, transmission, distribution buses, substations and transform-
ers, while links model the transmission lines. The links are weighted by the admittance
(or impedance) value of the corresponding transmission lines.
In line with many other researchers [24, 25, 26], MATCASC computes the flow val-
ues throughout a network by DC load flow analysis. An initial failure of a component
changes the balance of power flow distribution over the grid and causes redistribution
of power flow over the network. This dynamic response of the system to this triggering
event might overload other parts in the network. The protection mechanism trips these
newly overloaded components, and the power flow is again redistributed potentially
resulting in new overloads. In a power grid, each line has a relay protecting it from
permanent damage due to e.g. excessive flows. If overloaded, an over-current relay no-
tifies a circuit breaker to trip a line when the current of the line exceeds its rated limit
and this violation lasts long enough to permanently damage the line. The rated limit
of a transmission line is assumed to be proportional to it’s initial flow with a tolerance
level [27, 28, 21, 29, 30] α. For the sake of simplicity, this paper assumes a deter-
ministic model for the line tripping mechanism, i.e. a circuit breaker for a line trips at
the moment the flow of the line exceeds its rated limit. In case of islanding, cascading
failures continue in each island in which generators or loads are shed respectively to
attain a supply-demand balance. The cascade of failures continues until no more com-
ponents are overloaded. After the cascade subsides, the robustness of the grid against
cascading failures is quantified in terms of the fraction of the served power demand
after the cascading failures.
The cascading failure simulation process is described as follows:
1. Select a line threat either randomly or based on a specific attack strategy.
2. Remove the line threat, update the grid topology (i.e. admittance matrix [31]),
and compute the line flow values based on DC load flow analysis.
3. Check the connectedness of the grid. If there are islands, in each island the
cascading failures continue separately. In each island, adjust generation and load
respectively to attain a power balance.
4. Check the flow limit violations of the transmission lines. If the flow value of a
transmission line exceeds its rated limit, label the corresponding line as the line
threat, and repeat steps 2, 3, and 4.
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5. If there are no further line overloads, report the shed/still satisfied (served) power
demand after the cascade.
3 Spectral Graph Metrics
This section elaborates on complex network preliminaries including definitions of rel-
evant concepts, and relevant metrics from spectral graph theory including spectral ra-
dius, algebraic connectivity, and effective graph resistance.
A network G(N ,L) consisting of a setN of N nodes and a set ofL of L links, can be
represented by its adjacency matrix A. The adjacency matrix of a simple, unweighted
graph G(N ,L) is an N × N symmetric matrix reflecting the interconnection of the
nodes in the graph: aij = 0 indicates that there is no edge, otherwise aij = 1. For a
weighted graph, the network is represented by a weighted adjacency matrix W where
wij corresponds to the weight of the link between nodes i and j; a weight can be e.g. a
distance, cost, or delay.
The eigenvalues of an adjacency matrix of a graph reveal important characteristics
of a network. The largest eigenvalue of a graph with adjacency matrix W is called [18]
the Spectral radius ρ(W ) of the network. The spectral radius plays an important role in
dynamic processes on networks. For instance, in epidemics, a phase transition occurs
at the epidemic threshold τc for virus spreading rate τ : if τ is smaller than τc, then the
virus dies out, whereas for τ larger than τc, the virus spreads over the network. Van
Mieghem et al. [14] relate the spectral radius of a network directly to its robustness
with respect to virus spread in the network, and shows that the epidemic threshold is
the inverse of the spectral radius of the network. In addition to the virus spread, the
same type of phase transition threshold in the coupling strength gc ∼ 1ρ occurs in a
network of coupled oscillators [15].
The weighted Laplacian matrix [18]Q is another way to fully characterize a graph,
and is defined as:
Q = ∆−W (1)
where ∆ is the diagonal matrix of the strengths of G: δi=
∑N
j wij . Hence, the Lapla-
cian can be constructed as follows:
Qij =

δi, if i = j.
−wij , if i 6= j and (i, j) ∈ L
0, otherwise.
(2)
The Laplacian matrix constructed by susceptance (inverse of reactance [31]) val-
ues is equivalent to admittance matrix in power systems theory. Because the Laplacian
is symmetric, positive semi-definite and its rows sum up to zero, the eigenvalues of
the Laplacian are positive and real except for the smallest one µN that is zero. The
algebraic connectivity [18] µN−1 of a network is the second smallest eigenvalue of
its Laplacian matrix. Algebraic connectivity reflects how well a network is topologi-
cally connected. A relatively large µN−1 indicates a relatively well-connected topology
while a zero value for µN−1 means that the network is disconnected.
4
The effective resistance [18] Rij between a pair of nodes i and j is the potential
difference between these nodes when a unit current is injected at node i and withdrawn
at node j. The effective graph resistance RG is the sum of the individual effective
resistances between each pair of nodes in the network. The effective graph resistance
is a measure of how well a graph is connected in terms of electrical resistance. The
existence of parallel paths between two nodes in a physical power grid topology, and
a homogeneous distribution of their impedance values result in a smaller effective re-
sistance between these two nodes (i.e. a stronger electrical connection between these
nodes). Koç et al. [32, 33] show that the effective graph resistance relates the topology
of a power grid to its robustness against cascading failures. A power grid topology with
relatively small RG results in a higher level of robustness against cascading failures by
targeted attacks. The effective graph resistance of a network also equals the sum of the
inverse of the eigenvalues of its Laplacian matrix:
RG = N
N−1∑
i=1
1
µi
(3)
where µi is the ith eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix, and µ1 ≥ µ2 ≥ ... ≥ µN−1 ≥
µN .
4 Experimental Methodology
The experimental method used in this analysis is to consider a variety of power systems
and subject them to deliberate attacks under various loading levels to determine the
phase transition. This approach makes it possible to assess the relationship between the
spectral graph metrics and phase transition behaviour of the power grid. This section
elaborates on the deployed power systems, attack strategies, and determination of the
phase transition point.
4.1 Power grids: IEEE power systems and the synthetic grids
The computation of the spectral graph metrics for a power grid requires data describing
its topology (i.e. interconnection of buses with lines) and admittance values of trans-
mission lines, while simulation of cascading failures to determine the phase transition
behaviour necessitates information about the number of buses, their types and finally
their generation capacity and load values. As IEEE power systems provide all of these
data, they are considered as the reference systems. Due to the limited number of the
IEEE power systems, additional synthetic power systems are created based on these
reference IEEE power systems.
The synthetic power systems generated for the purpose of experimentation have
exactly the same properties as the reference IEEE test system (e.g. topology, number
of buses and links, type of buses and their demand-generation capacity values) except
for the admittance matrix. To create a new synthetic power system based on the IEEE
reference system, to manipulate the spectral graph metrics and the phase transition be-
haviour, e.g. 10% of the lines of the reference power system are randomly chosen and
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impedance values of these transmission lines are increased by themselves. For exam-
ple, when creating a synthetic power system based on the IEEE 30 power system [34]
(consisting of 30 buses and 41 lines), 4 transmission lines are randomly chosen: l1, l2,
l3, l4. Then the impedance values of these lines (i.e. x1, x2, x3, x4) are doubled so
that a new synthetic power system is created with its lines l1, l2, l3, l4 having the new
impedance values: 2x1, 2x2, 2x3, 2x4. This change of impedance values results in a
different power flow distribution over the network, and subsequently a different level
of robustness for each network. A second synthetic test system is subsequently created
from the reference IEEE 30 power systems by multiplying the impedance values of
these lines by a factor of three so that l1, l2, l3, l4 have the impedance values of 3x1,
3x2, 3x3, 3x4, respectively.
To create the synthetic power grids, the impedance values of transmission lines
are manipulated rather than removing/adding lines to the real(istic) IEEE power sys-
tem topology. This approach preserves the realistic structure of the systems while it
generates a large number of synthetic power systems.
4.2 Attack Strategies
To determine phase transition behaviour, the response of a power system to attacks is
assessed under various loading levels. This paper designs attack strategies based on (i)
edge betweenness and (ii) electrical node significance centralities.
The edge betweenness centrality [35] of a link is a graph topological metric quanti-
fying the topological centrality of a link in a network. The edge betweenness centrality
of a link l is defined as the normalized number of shortest paths between any pair of
nodes passing through l.
CB(l) =
∑
s,t∈N
σst(l)
σst
(4)
where σst(l) is the number of shortest paths passing through line l, while σst is the
total number of shortest paths in the grid topology. An attack based on betweenness
centrality targets the line with the highest betweenness centrality.
The electrical node significance [36, 37] is a contextual node centrality measure,
specifically designed for power grids. The electrical node significance δ of a node i is
defined as the amount of power distributed by node i, normalized by the total amount
of the power that is distributed in the entire grid:
δi =
Pi∑N
j=1 Pj
(5)
where Pi stands for the total power distributed by node i. An attack based on δ requires
targeting the most heavily loaded outgoing link from the node with the highest electrical
node significance in the network. Removal of this link most likely results in the largest
cascading failure in the power network [38].
6
4.3 Computation of the critical loading threshold
An effective way of determining the phase transition point of a power grid is to assess
the network robustness for a broad range of network loading levels l. The loading level
of a component is the ratio of the actual load to the rated limit (i.e. maximum capac-
ity) of the component, and it is assumed to be uniform throughout the network. An
increase/decrease of l is achieved by simultaneously increasing/decreasing the power
demand by a factor while keeping the network fixed. The damage resulting from cas-
cading failures depends on the network loading level l of the system. When the value
of l is sufficiently large, an arbitrary attack causes grid to collapse because the capacity
of each line is strictly limited. On the other hand, if l is sufficiently small, because all
the lines have larger margins to afford additional power flow, no substantial damage
emerges and the grid remains functional. With the increase of l, a crossover behaviour
of the system occurs from no breakdown to a large scale breakdown. This crossover
behaviour is represented by a critical loading threshold lc, at which a transition occurs
from the normal state to the collapse. When l < lc, the grid maintains its normal state
after an attack, while when l > lc, an attack collapses the grid because the lines do not
have enough capacity to afford the excess power.
Figure 1 plots the fraction of served power demand after cascades (induced by
electrical node significance based attacks) as a function of the network loading level
for the IEEE 118 power system (consisting of 118 buses and 181 lines). Figure 1 shows
that for the region of l < 0.4 and for l > 0.8, the network damage is stable. On the
other hand, a transition from small-scale to large-scale damage occurs in 0.8 > l > 0.4.
Accordingly, a small increase in l disproportionally increases the damage caused by an
attack on a network.
In complex systems and statistical physics, a phase transition entails an abrupt
change in some measured quantities of the system when the system goes through a
critical point. For a type-1 phase transition, this change is discontinuous, while for a
type-2 transition, the change is continuous [8]. In the context of power grids, when
the measured quantity is the robustness of the system to cascades, a critical loading
point can be determined accurately for type-1 transitions due to discontinuity in the
robustness of the system. Such clear critical loading points do not exist for type-2
phase transitions. Figure 1 suggests that a power system can exhibit a type-1 phase
transition in its robustness. To enable determination of a critical point for each power
system, this paper defines the critical loading threshold lc as the loading level at which
an attack results in the loss of 50% of the total power demand. To determine lc, the
robustness curve of a system is approximated by an 8th order polynomial. Figure 1
illustrates the concepts of robustness curve, its 8th order polynomial approximation,
and critical loading threshold for the IEEE 118 power system. It shows that the 50%
loss of served power demand occurs as a result of an attack on the grid when l=0.62,
hence lc=0.62.
As observed in other recent studies [7, 39], Figure 1 shows that the fraction of
served power demand is, counter intuitively, a non-monotonic decreasing function of
the loading level in the system. Consequently, an increase/decrease in the loading
level may occasionally result in a more/less robust network. This suggests existence of
Braess’s Paradox in the electrical power grids, stating that adding/creating extra capac-
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Figure 1: The robustness curve, its 8th order polynomial approximation, and the cor-
responding critical loading threshold for IEEE 118 power system
ity to/in a network can occasionally reduce the overall performance of a network [40].
5 Numerical Analysis
This section investigates the impact of topological changes on the phase transition be-
haviour of a power grid, by assessing the relationship between critical loading thresh-
old and spectral radius, algebraic connectivity, and effective graph resistance in a power
grid. First the impact of line removal on the phase transition in power grids are investi-
gated. Then, the relationship between the topology and the phase transitions is assessed
quantitatively.
5.1 Impact of line removal on phase transition in power grids
To assess the impact of line removal on the phase transitions in a power grid, the IEEE
30 power system, consisting of 30 buses and 41 lines (See Figure 2) is considered as
a use case. 10% of its lines (i.e. 4 lines) are randomly chosen: line ID 15 (connecting
bus 4 to bus 12), line ID 24 (connecting bus 19 to bus 20), line ID 29 (connecting bus
21 to bus 22) and line ID 37 (connecting bus 27 to bus 29). The IEEE 30 power system
is weakened by removing these randomly chosen lines progressively. At each time,
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Figure 2: The single line diagram and the graph representation of IEEE 30 power
system.
the spectral graph metrics of the weakened system are computed and the critical load-
ing threshold is determined by attacking the network based on betweenness centrality.
Figure 3 shows the result.
Figure 3 shows how line removal affects the spectral graph metrics and the critical
loading point of the IEEE 30 power system. As expected, removing a line from the
topology of a power system weakens it and results in a smaller lc, i.e. an earlier phase
transition. For instance, in Figure 3.a, removing the line with ID 15 (connecting bus 4 to
bus 12 in Figure 2) from the IEEE 30 power system topology shifts the critical loading
point of the system from a loading level of 87% to 86%. As more lines are removed
from the topology, lc becomes smaller and smaller with different gradients. RG and
µN−1 capture this behaviour of lc to different extents, while ρ behaves differently
than lc as more lines are removed from the topology. RG and µN−1 have similar
patterns; as lines are removed progressively, RG becomes smaller and smaller while
µN−1 becomes larger and larger. On the other hand, the ρ of the network shows a
different pattern; progressive line removal results first in a very slight, and then in a
very steep change in the network spectral radius.
In Figure 3 , removing transmission lines from the IEEE 30 power system increases
the electrical distances between the buses and results in an increased RG. On the other
hand, these line removals decreases the topological connectivity and diameter [14] of
the network, therefore µN−1 and ρ decrease. These trends in the spectral graph metrics
in Figure 3 also comply with the fundamental characteristics of these metrics. RG is
a monotonic non-increasing function of the number of transmission lines in a power
grid network [41]. Hence, in Figure 3, removing the transmission lines from the IEEE
30 power system results in an increase in RG. On the other hand, µN−1 and ρ are
the monotonic non-decreasing functions of the number of transmission lines in a net-
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Figure 3: The impact of line removal on lc vs. RG, ρ, and µN−1 in the IEEE 30 power
system. The grid is attacked based on betweenness centrality.
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work [18]. As a result, in Figure 3, removing the transmission lines from the system
results in a decrease of µN−1 and ρ.
5.2 Relating phase transitions to topology in power grids
To quantitatively assess the relationship between lc and the spectral graph metrics RG,
µN−1, and ρ the IEEE 30, IEEE 57, and the relatively larger IEEE 118 power systems
are considered as use cases. These IEEE power systems are considered as reference
systems, and an additional set of 99 synthetic power systems are generated for each
power system following the methodology in Sec. 4.1. The topological changes in these
test systems are quantified by RG, µN−1, and ρ. The test power systems are subjected
to attacks, their robustness curves (See Figure 1) are determined, and the phase tran-
sition points under the electrical node significance and the betweenness based attacks
are determined by lc. For each test power system, the results obtained from the spectral
radius, the algebraic connectivity, and the effective graph resistance are compared to
the critical loading threshold of the systems to assess the relationship between these
metrics.
Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 quantitatively show to what extent RG, ρ and µN−1
capture the phase transition behaviour in the IEEE 30, IEEE 57, and IEEE 118 power
systems, respectively. It shows the typical values of Pearson’s linear correlation coeffi-
cient [42] q between lc and the spectral graph metrics RG, ρ, and µN−1. The algebraic
connectivity outperforms the other two metrics in estimating the phase transition be-
haviour of power grids. For example, in the IEEE 118 power system case, for both
of the attack strategies, µN−1 correlates positively to the critical loading point with
a linear correlation coefficient of around 90%, while the spectral radius has a linear
correlation level of around 50% (See Table 3).
Table 1: Linear correlation coefficients q between (lc,RG), (lc,ρ), and (lc,µN−1) for
the IEEE 30 power systems for δ-based and CB-based attacks.
δ-based attack CB-based attack
q lc lc
RG -0.649 -0.662
ρ 0.426 0.5571
µN−1 0.862 0.719
Table 2: Linear correlation coefficients q between (lc,RG), (lc,ρ), and (lc,µN−1) for
the IEEE 57 power systems for δ-based and CB-based attacks.
δ-based attack CB-based attack
q lc lc
RG -0.739 -0.642
ρ 0.722 0.547
µN−1 0.822 0.706
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Table 3: Linear correlation coefficients q between (lc,RG), (lc,ρ), and (lc,µN−1) for
the IEEE 118 power systems for δ-based and CB-based attacks (See Figure4).
δ-based attack CB-based attack
q lc lc
RG -0.866 -0.834
ρ 0.482 0.576
µN−1 0.921 0.932
The effective graph resistance has a negative correlation with the critical loading
threshold while the spectral radius and algebraic connectivity correlate positively with
the critical loading threshold. Increasing the impedance values of transmission lines
of a power grid results in an increased (or unchanged) RG of the grid as RG is a
monotonic non-decreasing function of the impedance values of the individual trans-
mission lines [41]. On the other hand, as the impedance values progressively increase,
ρ and µN−1 of the system progressively decrease (or remain unchanged) because ρ and
µN−1 are monotonic non-increasing functions of the impedance values of the individ-
ual transmission lines [18].
The spectral graph metrics are monotonic non-decreasing/-increasing functions of
the impedance values of the individual transmission lines. Therefore, when creating the
new test power systems, the progressive increase of impedance values results in sorted
spectral graph metric values for these test power systems: RG in ascending order,
µN−1 and ρ in descending order. Consequently, the Spearman’s correlation coefficient
that measures the strength of association between two ranked variables, produces the
same (absolute) result for (lc,RG), (lc,ρ), and (lc,µN−1). Table 4 shows the absolute
values of the Spearman’s correlation coefficient for the IEEE 30, IEEE 57, and IEEE
118 power systems under δ-based and CB-based attacks.
Table 4: The absolute values of the Spearman’s correlation coefficients rs between
(lc,RG), (lc,ρ), and (lc,µN−1) for the IEEE power systems for δ-based and CB-based
attacks. rs is negative for (lc,RG), and positive for (lc,ρ) and (lc,µN−1)
rs δ-based attack CB-based attack
IEEE 30 0.667 0.691
IEEE 57 0.616 0.630
IEEE 118 0.845 0.872
Figure4 and Figure5 illustrates the relationship between the metrics by plotting
the critical loading threshold, effective graph resistance, spectral radius and algebraic
connectivity for the test power systems obtained from the IEEE 118 power system. The
test power systems are attacked with an electrical node significance δ (see Figure4) and
betweenness centrality CB(see Figure5) based strategy.
In both of the attack strategies in Figure4 and Figure5, lc exhibits first a steep
and then a slight decrease. As the impedance values of the chosen transmission lines
increases, the ability of the grid to better distribute and accommodate the excess power
12
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Figure 4: Critical loading threshold and spectral graph metrics for the test power sys-
tems (consisting of the IEEE 118 power system and its derivative synthetic power sys-
tems). Due to differences in the impedance values of these systems, each test system
has different values for the critical loading threshold, and for the spectral graph metrics.
Different test systems are represented by ’Power system ID’ (ranging from 1 to 100).
Test systems are attacked with an electrical node significance based strategy.
flow over the grid degenerates. This results in an earlier phase transition in the damage
due to cascading line overloads. All of the three metrics of effective graph resistance,
spectral radius and algebraic connectivity capture this behaviour of the network and
track the shift in the phase transition to a varying degree.
To assess whether the spectral graph metrics capture the phase transition behaviour
of power grids under different random transmission line choices when creating the syn-
thetic power systems (See Sec. 4.1), the numerical analysis is extended. The IEEE 118
power system is considered as a reference case. The 10 % of it’s transmission lines
are randomly chosen, additional 99 synthetic power systems are generated, and lc, RG,
µN−1, and ρ values are determined for this set of 100 test systems. This process is
repeated 100 times: 100 sets of 100 test power systems are generated and for each set
of test systems lc, RG, µN−1, and ρ values are determined. Then, two different exper-
iments are done: (i) lc, RG, µN−1, and ρ values are averaged over these 100 instances
and the correlation level between these averaged results are determined, (ii) for each
individual set of test systems, the correlation levels (lc,RG), (lc,ρ), and (lc,µN−1) are
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Figure 5: Critical loading threshold and spectral graph metrics for the IEEE 118 and
its derivative synthetic power systems. Test systems are attacked with a betweenness
centrality based strategy.
determined. Figure 6 and Figure 7 illustrates the averaged lc, RG, µN−1, and ρ val-
ues, while Table 5 shows the correlation levels between these averaged results from (i).
Table 6 shows the mean and the standard deviation of the individual correlation levels
from (ii).
Table 5: Linear correlation coefficients q between (lc,RG), (lc,ρ), and (lc,µN−1) for the
IEEE 118 power systems for δ-based and CB-based attacks. The lc, RG, ρ, and µN−1
are averaged over 100 different instances.
δ-based attack CB-based attack
q lc lc
RG -0.873 -0.799
ρ 0.495 0.628
µN−1 0.888 0.839
The results in Figure 6, Figure 7, and Table 5 show that averaging the results over
100 instances (in which the transmission lines are randomly chosen when creating
the test systems) does not change the results: µN−1 again outperforms the other two
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Figure 6: Critical loading threshold and spectral graph metrics for the IEEE 118 and
its derivative synthetic power systems. The results are averaged over 100 random in-
stances. Test systems are attacked with an electrical node significance based strategy.
metrics in anticipating the phase transition point of the IEEE 118 power system. The
linear correlation coefficient remains around the same level compared to the individual
correlation level (See Table 3 and Table 5): % 88.8 for a δ-based attack strategy and %
83.9 for a CB-based attack strategy. The Spearman’s rank correlation further increases
to % 96.5 for a δ-based attack strategy and % 95.8 for a CB-based attack strategy.
Table 6: The mean and the standard deviation of the 100 linear correlation coefficients
q between (lc,RG), (lc,ρ), and (lc,µN−1) for the IEEE 118 power systems for δ-based
attacks.
Mean std
q lc lc
RG - 0.642 0.261
ρ 0.551 0.240
µN−1 0.729 0.278
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Figure 7: Critical loading threshold and spectral graph metrics for the IEEE 118 and
its derivative synthetic power systems. The results are averaged over 100 random in-
stances. Test systems are attacked with an betweenness centrality based strategy.
6 Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of the topology of a power grid on the phase transi-
tions in its robustness to cascading line overloads. Three spectral graph metrics, effec-
tive graph resistance RG, spectral radius ρ and algebraic connectivity µN−1, that are
used in the emerging field of network science to measure the robustness of networks,
are considered and the relationship between these metrics and the phase transition be-
haviour of a power grid is assessed.
The IEEE 118 buses power system and their derivative synthetic grids are used
as test cases. For each power system (i) RG, (ii) ρ, and (iii) µN−1 are evaluated,
while their phase transition points are determined by (iv) the critical loading threshold
lc. Since lc is based on simulations and takes into account specific details of power
grids, the results from this metric are considered as the reference. The results from the
first three metrics are compared to the results from lc to assess to what extent these
graph theoretical metrics capture the phase transition behaviour of power grids. The
numerical analysis on a model of power grids show that µN−1 performs best to capture
the phase transition behaviour with a correlation level e.g. in case of IEEE 118 power
system around 90% while ρ relates relatively less accurately to the phase transitions
with a correlation level around 50%.
The experimental results in this paper suggest that µN−1 performs best in estimat-
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ing the phase transition in the robustness of power grids while ρ of a power grid relates
less accurately to these transitions compared to µN−1 and RG. This seems to contrast
with the results from other fields such as epidemic processes and network synchroni-
sation [13, 14, 15] in which the critical breakdown threshold is related to the spectral
radius ρ of the network. The phase transitions in the robustness of power grids are
connectivity-based, while those in the dynamic systems such as epidemic processes
and network synchronisation are process-based (and thus determined by the differen-
tial equations, whose solutions depend on the spectrum of the adjacency matrix of the
underlying network). Consequently, the spectral radius relates to the process-based
phase transitions (e.g. phase transitions in the epidemic processes), while the alge-
braic connectivity and the effective graph resistance that measure the connectivity of a
network, relate to the connectivity-based phase transitions.
The critical loading threshold lc defines a reference point for the system loading
level at which the risk and the size of damage due to cascade increases abruptly. De-
signing and optimising the power system topologies appropriately with respect to this
critical point enhances the robustness of power grids to cascading failures. The exper-
imental results from this paper demonstrate the potential of the spectral graph metrics,
in particular the potential of µN−1, as measures to design/optimize power grid topolo-
gies for an enhanced phase transition behaviour.
The experimental results on the IEEE 118 power system (See Figure 1) show that
increasing the loading level in a power grid may occasionally cause a higher level of
robustness. This result suggests the existence of Brasess’s Paradox in the electrical
power systems. Braess’s Paradox that is shown to occur in the road traffic networks,
states that adding/creating extra capacity to/in a network can occasionally reduce the
overall performance of a network. The future work will focus on the investigation of
Braess’s Paradox in electrical power grids.
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